Improved Bounds on Restricted Isometry Constants for Gaussian Matrices

The Restricted Isometry Constants (RIC) of a matrix $A$ measures how close to an isometry is the action of $A$ on vectors with few nonzero entries, measured in the $\ell^2$ norm. Specifically, the upper and lower RIC of a matrix $A$ of size $n\times N$ is the maximum and the minimum deviation from unity (one) of the largest and smallest, respectively, square of singular values of all ${N\choose k}$ matrices formed by taking $k$ columns from $A$. Calculation of the RIC is intractable for most matrices due to its combinatorial nature; however, many random matrices typically have bounded RIC in some range of problem sizes $(k,n,N)$. We provide the best known bound on the RIC for Gaussian matrices, which is also the smallest known bound on the RIC for any large rectangular matrix. Improvements over prior bounds are achieved by exploiting similarity of singular values for matrices which share a substantial number of columns.Comment: 16 pages, 8 figure

Theory and Applications of Robust Optimization

In this paper we survey the primary research, both theoretical and applied, in the area of Robust Optimization (RO). Our focus is on the computational attractiveness of RO approaches, as well as the modeling power and broad applicability of the methodology. In addition to surveying prominent theoretical results of RO, we also present some recent results linking RO to adaptable models for multi-stage decision-making problems. Finally, we highlight applications of RO across a wide spectrum of domains, including finance, statistics, learning, and various areas of engineering.Comment: 50 page

Multi-store Competition: Market Segmentation or Interlacing

This paper develops a model for multi-store competition between firms. Using the fact that different firms have different outlets and produce horizontally differentiated goods, we obtain a pure strategy equilibrium where firms choose a different location for each outlet and firms' locations are interlaced. The location decisions of multi-store firms are completely independent of each other. Firms choose locations that minimize transportation costs of consumers. Moreover, generically, the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique and when the firms have an equal number of outlets, prices are independent of the number of outlets